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Abstract 
The rise of the city-region concept has focussed attention on the nature of territorial politics 
underpinning city-regionalism.  This paper investigates the relationship between territorial 
politics, city-regionalism and the collective provision of mass transportation infrastructure in 
the United States (US). It deploys a case study of the Denver region, examining the state and 
governance structures driving forward FasTracks, a long-term project to expand the Denver 
Regional Transportation District’s light and commuter rail system. FasTracks represents a 
program to retrofit the Denver city-region for integrated mass transit but its funding has 
fostered tensions around new regionalist governance arrangements. The paper uses the 
findings of the case study to reflect upon the balance of ‘bottom up’ versus ‘top down’ 
geopolitical forces shaping the landscape of city-regionalism in the US. It emphasizes the 
variety of ways in which struggles around infrastructure provision shape the emergence of 
new city-regionalist structures inside the competition state.  
Key words: city-regionalism, infrastructure, territorial politics, Denver, USA 
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Introduction 
Several urban scholars have recently suggested that economic globalization is sustained by 
the rapid growth of city-regional agglomerations (Florida, 2008; Scott, 2001). A related claim 
– and one especially pertinent for the present discussion – is that the state is playing a far 
more circumscribed role in addressing the regulatory and infrastructural demands associated 
with city-regional growth; instead many states have resorted to new regionalist governance 
arrangements and a mixture of public and private local revenue sources to fund major new 
urban infrastructure investments (Brenner, 2002; 2004; Ward and Jonas, 2004). These new 
regionalist governance arrangements might, in turn, be symptomatic of the rise of the neo-
liberal ‘competition state’ and its attendant modes of financing infrastructure and urban 
development (Cerny, 2007; Jessop, 2002); as such, they can be contrasted with the height of 
Fordism in the 1950s and 1960s, a period notable for national Keynesian approaches to the 
provision of metropolitan infrastructure and urban policy (Cochrane, 1999; Florida and Jonas, 
1991). Further analysis of the relationship between city regionalism, state territorial structures 
and collective infrastructure provision promises to deliver new insights into the contemporary 
geopolitical landscape of capitalist development (Jonas, 2013).   
 At the moment, however, progress on these issues has been frustrated by an apparent 
impasse between, on the one hand, advocates of the relational approach to city-regionalism 
and, on the other, those for whom knowledge of territorial politics remains central to 
explaining the evolving landscape of urban and regional governance (Jonas, 2012). Relational 
theorists suggest that territorial approaches need to be augmented – if not replaced altogether 
– by new perspectives which recognise that many of the governance processes shaping urban 
and regional development do not map onto urban political space in a neat, one-to-one fashion 
(Allen and Cochrane, 2007; MacLeod and Jones, 2007). In a world of interconnected city-
regions, moreover, urban development actors, such as mayors, planners and economic 
development officials, increasingly look elsewhere in order to learn about urban policy 
innovations before attempting to implement such policies within their own jurisdictions 
(McCann and Ward, 2011). Therefore questions must be raised about where the limits of 
urban political territory occur and the circumstances under which metropolitan and city-
regional governance is assembled in different state territorial contexts (Cox, 2011).   
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 One important consideration is the balance of geopolitical forces at work shaping 
geographies of city-regionalism from within the competition state. It could be the case that 
some states actively seek to orchestrate city-regionalism centrally ‘from above,’ deploying 
public infrastructural investments in order to stimulate a competition for inward investment 
between city-regions (Harrison, 2008). If this were the case then the analysis of city-
regionalism could help to shed light on wider state competitiveness policies and geopolitical 
practices (Moisio, 2008; Jonas, 2013). Alternatively, it could be that the new forms of city-
regionalism are shaped by business groups, civil society organizations and local governments 
working ‘from below’ through city-regional ‘growth coalitions’ in a fashion akin to 
Harrison’s (2008) concept of ‘regionally-orchestrated centralism’. Here knowledge of 
territorial political contingencies would come into play such as, for example, how in the 
United States (US) city-regionalism overcomes the problem of metropolitan jurisdictional 
fragmentation and enables business-led ‘growth coalitions’ to build alliances with local 
politicians and electorates around collective infrastructure provision (Cox and Jonas, 1993). 
 With these considerations in mind, the aim of this paper is to investigate the evolving 
geopolitical landscape of city-regionalism inside the US. One noticeable feature of this 
landscape is the rise of new regionalist collaborative arrangements; these span cities, suburbs, 
counties and, in some cases, even entire metropolitan areas and are engaged in activities 
ranging from urban development to regional planning and growth management (Hamilton, 
2002; Orfield, 1997; Pastor et al., 2000). Whilst some of these new governance structures 
were originally set up to promote inward investment, others have since moved on to develop 
new territorial structures suitable for the delivery of regional mass transportation 
infrastructure, including light and commuter rail. The context for this shift on modes of 
collective provision in the US is a legacy of chronic under-provision of public mass transit in 
metropolitan areas, the decline of federal contribution to state and local transportation 
projects, and mounting fiscal stress at all levels of the US state.  
 The remainder of the paper is organized around a detailed case study of city-
regionalism in Denver, Colorado. With a population of 3.7 million residents, the Denver-
Boulder region currently occupies 29th place in Richard Florida’s global list of mega city-
regions, which uses “light-based regional product1” as a measure of regional economic output 
(Florida, 2008: Appendix A, pp. 312-13). Although Florida includes the entire Front Range 
urban corridor (Denver, Boulder, Colorado Springs, Pueblo, Fort Collins, and Greeley) in his 
definition of this region, our present focus is on the Denver-Aurora and Boulder metropolitan 
areas which account for approximately 75% of the region’s population (Figure 1). Within this 
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region, the Denver-Aurora MSA is composed of 10 counties and has a population of 2.54 
million.  Of these 10 counties, only 6 (Denver, Adams, Arapahoe, Broomfield, Douglas, and 
Jefferson) are represented in the Denver Urbanized Area, while parts of Boulder County (in 
the Boulder MSA) and Weld County (in the Greeley MSA) are also included in the 
contiguously built-up Denver urbanized area. Various business and local government 
organizations throughout this urbanized region have a track record of promoting economic 
development and infrastructure provision on a regional (multi-county) basis. Indeed, the 
Denver Metro Economic Development Organization describes the Denver region as 
possessing: 
  ...the nation’s first only truly regional economic development entity in which many area economic 
 development groups have joined together to represent, and further, the interests of an entire region. 
 Our partners include 70 cities, counties, and  economic development organizations in the seven-county 
 Metro Denver and two-county Northern Colorado region. (Metro Denver Economic Development 
 Corporation: http://www.metrodenver.org/about-metro-denver-edc/, first accessed March 2011). 
It appears, then, that city-regionalism is taken very seriously in Denver. However, as we shall 
argue in this paper, this powerful regional imaginary has occurred not without reference to 
territorial politics and, in particular, the balance of forces shaping ‘top down’ federally-
orchestrated metropolitanism versus ‘bottom up’ city-regionalism.  
***Figure 1 about here*** 
 In Denver’s case, moreover, city-regionalism has provided an opportunity to deliver 
the Denver Regional Transportation District’s rail transit project known as FasTracks. The 
FasTracks program involves a 122-mile extension of light and commuter rail in six corridors 
throughout the wider Denver region to be completed over the next ten or so years. After 
decades of conflict around urban economic development, an impressive regional coalition 
was forged to provide financial support for this program. In drawing together diverse urban, 
suburban and metropolitan political constituencies, the coalition has reshaped the economic, 
cultural and political modus operandi of a sprawling city-region which, until recently, was 
utterly dependent on automobile transportation. Even as the Denver region continues to grow 
outwards, its internal political dynamics have been transformed to embrace a new mode of 
collective provision in the form of mass transportation and its attendant flows of people and 
funding. Yet this particular city-regional power assemblage confronts ongoing fiscal and 
political tensions; tensions which have necessitated further state interventions ‘from above’. 
Therefore in describing the predominantly ‘bottom-up’ nature of city-regionalism in Denver, 
we also demonstrate how these local territorial contingencies feed into more recent ‘top 
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down’ federal interventions. In this respect, the paper offers a counterfoil to the recent turn 
away from territorial approaches to city-regional analysis.        
 
City-regionalism as geopolitics: the US context 
 Recently urban scholarship has drawn attention to the rise of city-regions as strategic 
nodes in global systems of distribution having the potential to draw power away from the 
national state (Florida, 2008; Scott, 2001). At the same time, urban scholars no longer think 
about the city-region as a self-contained territory in the sense of it comprising a political 
arena for the activities of urban growth coalitions unmediated by wider economic and 
political influences (Brenner, 2002; 2004). This has, in turn, encouraged a new conceptual 
emphasis upon the territorial reconfiguration of the state in relation to city-regions (Jonas and 
Ward, 2002). Yet there is still a prevailing view that city-regions develop at the expense of 
the national state rather than in response to, for example, how the state and its local and 
regional branches deliver economic development and infrastructure (Ward and Jonas, 2004). 
Critical attention is therefore turning towards the role of city-regions in the wider geopolitics 
of capitalist development (Harrison, 2013; Jonas, 2013).  
 In a recent contribution, Harrison (2008) has drawn a useful distinction between 
‘centrally-orchestrated regionalism’ – where the state reconfigures its territory in order to 
stimulate urban and regional development – and ‘regionally-orchestrated centralism’ – in 
which, for instance, urban and regional coalitions lobby the state for additional powers, 
resources and expenditures. What Harrison is hinting at is the need to examine the balance of 
geopolitical forces operating inside the competition state and shaping the landscape of city-
regionalism. An important mediating factor is the territorial structure of the state itself: for 
instance, the ways in which state infrastructural and fiscal capacities are allocated across 
different territories (e.g., allocations across federal, state, regional and municipal levels of the 
US state) and the associated tensions and struggles shaping city-regionalism and 
infrastructure provision either ‘from below’ or ‘from above’.  
 Studies suggest that in more centralized political-economic systems, such as the 
United Kingdom or Finland, the national state is quite instrumental in orchestrating city-
regionalism ‘from above’ (Harrison, 2010; Moisio, 2008). This central political orchestration 
of state territory could be a function of territorial bias in the allocation of state expenditures 
(e.g. attempting to bolster political party support in certain regions), new funding and grant 
regimes (e.g., new urban and regional arrangements for infrastructure and urban 
redevelopment) or efforts to make state territory more cost efficient (e.g., using city-
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regionalism as a mechanism to stimulate territorial competition). In other state contexts, 
notably in the US, the direction of territorial politics has often been ‘from below’ reflecting 
the power of local interests in urban and regional development (Cox and Mair, 1988). In the 
US, the revenue required to fund major public investments in infrastructure is today mainly 
derived from state and local sources, such as sales taxes, or is financed by long-term bond 
issues which are contingent upon local voter approval. With the decline in federal funding for 
major transportation projects, states and localities have been forced to assume a leading role 
in the funding of highways and mass transit projects. Moreover, as banks and other lenders 
look to infrastructure for new investment outlets, local authorities have in turn resorted to 
complicated public-private financing arrangements which must be tailored to local 
circumstances (Jonas and McCarthy, 2009). In this context, the assembly of governance 
around larger city-regional structures can be seen as the latest attempt to overcome not only 
the territorial-fiscal discrepancies arising from the political fragmentation of metropolitan 
areas (Teaford, 1979) but also shortfalls in federal funding for transportation infrastructure.2  
 Throughout the US metropolitan growth has spilled over into contiguous counties 
which are poorly served by public transportation infrastructure. Sometimes regional special 
purpose districts have been set up or expanded in order to deliver new services; but such 
districts still have to negotiate with local jurisdictions for agreements around land 
annexations, taxation levels, planning, land use designations, housing types and service levels 
(Cox and Jonas, 1993). What is often at issue is not just the regional provision of 
infrastructure but also meeting other service demands that come with new development, such 
as demands for affordable (low-to-middle income) housing, water and sewerage, schools, and 
so forth. Therefore in building the case for regional transportation provision, a major concern 
is to find ways of managing local political interests in collective consumption; interests which 
might wish to retain a more decentralized territorial structure of urban service provision 
(ibid.). To ignore the role of territorial politics in brokering city-regionalism ‘from below’ 
would be to overlook an important part of the geopolitical landscape in the US.  
 That said the US state has not been a neutral player as regards setting out the fiscal, 
legal and administrative conditions for the evolving landscape of city-regionalism. Indeed, 
there was an earlier phase of ‘top-down’ metropolitanism, which can be contrasted to the 
more recent era of collaborative ‘bottom-up’ city-regionalism.  In the 1950s and 1960s the 
Advisory Committee for Intergovernmental Relations (ACIR) and the Committee for 
Economic Development (CED) promoted at the federal level strong forms of metropolitan 
government to resolve region-wide problems of housing affordability and generate economies 
6 
 
of scale in urban service delivery (ACIR, 1967; CED, 1970: Bish, 1971). As a condition for 
receiving federal funds for interstate highway and other transportation construction, the 
federal government mandated the creation of metropolitan planning organizations through 
which all metropolitan transportation planning would be coordinated.  Federal interest in 
metropolitan political integration was further encouraged by civil rights groups such as the 
National Association for the Advancement of Colored People (NAACP) and the Urban 
League, if for very different reasons. These groups made the constitutional case for opening 
up the suburbs and suburban school districts to low-income households and minorities 
(Danielson, 1976; Downs, 1973). At this stage, federally-driven territorial politics had a 
strong focus on fiscal redistribution. In response, some central cities pursued vigorous 
annexation programs, mergers and consolidations; whilst others worked with newly-created 
metropolitan governments and regional transportation districts (Savitch and Vogel, 2000).  
 In the 1980s, ‘top-down’ metropolitan territorial politics gave way to a new model of 
regionalism built, as it were, from the ‘bottom up’ (Mitchell-Weaver et al., 2000). One of the 
motives for the New Regionalism, as it has come to be known, is finding ways of leveraging 
new taxes and other sources of funding for economic development given the failure of earlier 
attempts at metropolitan potential integration, the decline in federal funding and support for 
metropolitan planning, the widening fiscal disparities between the declining urban core and 
the fast-growing edge cities, the absence of integrated regional planning, and a legacy of 
under-investment in public urban infrastructure (Jonas and Ward, 2002). Mindful of the 
potential for suburban voter backlash, a premium has often been placed on loose 
confederations of regional governance rather than formal integrated metropolitan 
government. In its various guises, the New Regionalism has been promulgated by 
practitioners working through regional business, civic and local government networks often 
with the backing of private corporations and public policy advocacy groups (Wallis, 1994; 
Jonas and Pincetl, 2006).  
 The provision of regional transportation infrastructure has been a driver of many such 
New Regionalist initiatives across the US; but not all of them have been successful in terms 
of building regional governance capacities ‘from below’ around mass transit. In Detroit, the 
Metropolitan Organizing Strategy Enabling Strength (MOSES) was set up in 1997 to bring 
together businesses, religious leaders and civic activists involved in low-income and African-
American communities around a campaign to establish a regional transportation authority and 
to increase regional public transit funds (Alliance for Regional Stewardship, 2003, p.17). 
Despite numerous regional transit voter initiatives since the 1970s, it took until early 
7 
 
December 2012 for the State of Michigan finally to pass legislation to create a regional transit 
authority for metropolitan Detroit, lending credence to claims that racism and exclusionary 
practices had hitherto prevented greater central city-suburban collaboration. In a similar case 
in Wisconsin, a two-county $1.76 billion transportation package, which included provision 
for light rail, was put to the Milwaukee County and Waukesha County supervisory boards for 
consideration in 1997 but no action was taken by the respective boards on the grounds that it 
was felt that the service would provoke a voter backlash in the suburbs (Rowen, 2008). New 
Regionalist structures have, however, emerged in some outer metropolitan areas where there 
are severe shortfalls in mass transportation infrastructure. For example, in the I-495 suburban 
region of Greater Boston, the I-495/MetroWest Corridor Partnership was established in 2003 
with the support of local business groups, planners and local governments to address the 
Boston region’s mounting infrastructure deficit and a backlog in road improvement projects 
(Jonas et al., 2010).  
 In the Denver region, local business and civic organisations have been very mindful 
of local jurisdictional obstacles to regional governance. In the 1990s, the Alliance for 
Regional Stewardship (which is affiliated to the American Chambers of Commerce 
Executives) became an ardent proponent of the New Regionalism in Denver and one of its 
most active champions – until his untimely death in 2007 – was John Parr of Civic Results, a 
consultancy organization based in the City of Denver. Parr and the Alliance published a 
monograph series on regional stewardship, drawing attention to national models of 
‘community regionalism’ such as the MOSES partnership. Table 1 represents the Alliance’s 
approach to regional leadership. This approach places a premium on ‘regional’ networking 
and collaboration rather than a traditional ‘local’ or single-jurisdiction approach. Its focus is 
on building regional alliances ‘from below’ drawing upon existing local capacities but 
recognizing the challenges of bringing together collaborative regional partnerships where 
local inter-jurisdictional tensions have prevailed. As we now show, overcoming internecine 
tensions has been a serious impediment to regionalism in Denver. The model of city-
regionalism that has evolved tries to balance historical tensions around economic 
development and new demands to fund infrastructure and services on a metropolitan basis.  
***Table 1 about here*** 
   
Building city-regionalism in Denver: overcoming territorial politics 
We now turn to the case of Denver to examine in more detail how city-regionalism has 
evolved in response to the changing landscape of territorial politics. Our aim is to use this 
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case study to flesh out some of the territorial contingencies shaping the geopolitics of city-
regionalism inside the US (Jonas, 2013). At the end of World War Two, Denver was a major 
trans-continental rail hub with an extensive network of rail infrastructure. The City also 
operated a municipal rail transit (streetcar) system, but this was wound up in the early 1950s. 
The demand for mass transit was eclipsed by the private automobile and new demands for 
suburban freeway infrastructure. In 1955 Adams, Arapahoe, and Jefferson counties and the 
City and County of Denver formed the Inter-County Regional Planning Association (ICRPA) 
“to plan for the development of the metropolitan area ... and to meet the common problems 
that confront the four counties" (DRCOG, 2010).  In 1958, the Association’s name was 
changed to the Inter-County Regional Planning Commission (ICRPC), and the first regional 
transportation plan was approved.  In 1968, its name was changed again to the Denver 
Regional Council of Governments (DRCOG) to “signify the responsibility of the core city to 
its neighbors” (DRCOG, 2005).   
 In 1969, DRCOG supported state legislation that created the Regional Transportation 
District (RTD) and entered into a memorandum of agreement with the Colorado Department 
of Highways (CDOH) and RTD to jointly plan the region’s transportation facilities (ibid.).   
RTD was specifically charged with responsibility “to develop, maintain, and operate a mass 
transportation system” in Denver and all or parts of five surrounding counties (Adams, 
Arapahoe, Boulder, Douglas, and Jefferson) (Denver Metropolitan Study Panel, 1976).  
RTD’s governing board of directors was formed with ten members from the City and County 
of Denver appointed by the Mayor; two members each from Adams, Arapahoe, Boulder, and 
Jefferson Counties and one member from Douglas County appointed by their county 
commissioners; and two at-large members appointed by the Board (ibid.). As we shall argue, 
the RTD’s regional jurisdiction corresponds more or less to the territorial scale at which city-
regionalism operates in Denver. 3   
 Initial ‘top down’ efforts to bring about metropolitan collaboration were by-and-large 
not successful. Many suburban jurisdictions remained wary, both of Denver and regional 
agencies like RTD and DRCOG, and jealously guarded local municipal powers. For example, 
an effort by the Colorado State Legislature in 1961 to create a metropolitan capital 
improvement district ended when the Colorado Supreme Court ruled that the district violated 
the Colorado Constitution’s home rule provisions (Denver Metropolitan Study Panel, 1976). 
Subsequently, plans in 1965, 1967 and 1968 to create an urban super-county to consolidate 
services such as water and sewerage were rejected by the State legislature (Leonard and Noel, 
1990). The suburbs surrounding Denver, including Aurora, Englewood, and Westminster, set 
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about developing their own water systems so as not to be dependent on the Denver Water 
Department.  After a period of frequent droughts and rapid suburbanization in the 1950s, the 
Denver Water Department established a “Blue Line” around the metropolitan area, beyond 
which it refused to supply water.  Denver was not alone in respect of a growing central city 
which used its control of water and other strategic infrastructure to forestall suburbanization 
and protect the municipal tax base (Jonas, 1991). In the event, as the suburbs developed their 
own service capacities and competed with Denver for new development, restricted access to 
the Denver water system might not have inhibited the growth of the wider region; but it did 
intensify the problem of metropolitan political fragmentation.   
 Throughout the 1970s concerns over rapid metropolitan growth drove further efforts 
at regional collaboration, though intra-metropolitan discord was a more prevalent theme. At 
times territorial-political discourses in Denver were resonant with wider geopolitical 
references. For example, when faced with the possibility that the City and County of Denver 
would annex a major office development to the southeast of the City in a neighboring county, 
the mayor of the local community of Greenwood Village, Harold Patton, proclaimed that “we 
will fight Denver in all ways possible like Poland did when Hitler decided he needed more 
land.   . . . We will fight until they are as bloody as a bull’s hock” (Denver Post 1975, quoted 
in Leonard and Noel 1990, p. 293).  Such virulent geopolitical opposition to Denver was 
further fuelled by a new environmental politics, which focused attention on the negative 
externalities of major urban economic development projects for which the City of Denver had 
been competing. Notably, in 1972 Denver was selected by the International Olympic 
Committee to host the 1976 Winter Olympic Games with strong support from the Governor 
of Colorado, the Mayor of Denver, and pro-growth business interests in the City (Leonard 
and Noel, 1990). Opposition groups, led by Colorado State representative Richard Lamm, 
questioned the environmental and financial impacts of the Olympics.  Environmental 
awareness was particularly acute at that time shortly after the promulgation of the National 
Environmental Policy Act of 1969, the Clean Air Act of 1970, and other environmental 
legislation.  In a State-wide referendum in 1972, Colorado voters rejected by a 3-2 margin 
hosting the Winter Olympic Games, the first and only time in history that an already-selected 
city rejected the Olympics.  Support for the referendum united diverse urban and suburban 
electoral constituencies (Lamm, pers. com., 2011). It spurred efforts on the part of business 
and political élites in Denver to foster greater city-regional collaboration.  
 
 
10 
 
Towards ‘bottom up’ city-regional collaboration in the 1980s 
Arguably, the era of city-regionalism in Denver can be traced back to this period. A crucial 
consideration was how to broker ‘from below’ the territorial politics of metropolitan 
development. Once again the changing wider fiscal context was critical. The 1980s were 
marked by intense intra-regional competition for jobs, investment and tax revenues and also 
growing tensions around regional infrastructure as Denver assumed the characteristics of a 
sprawling Sunbelt city albeit vulnerable to periodic recessions (Judd, 1983). Counties and 
municipalities across the region competed against each other to lure retail and other business 
opportunities to their jurisdictions, prompting the Denver-based business and political 
leadership to embrace New Regionalist thinking and imaginaries. For instance, Richard 
Fleming, President of the Greater Denver Chamber of Commerce, said in 1990:  
The world sees Denver as you see it from an airplane—without artificial boundaries.  We should treat it 
that way and deal together on common problems of air pollution, economic development, 
transportation, and water.  We need to market Denver as a five-county metropolis and let prospects see 
all the alternatives.  That’s a lot better than having each county try to build itself up by running down 
the others (cited in Leonard and Noel, 1990, p. 473).     
Initially, collaboration around economic development occurred on a jurisdiction-by-
jurisdiction basis. For example, in 1984 Aurora and Denver agreed to a revenue-sharing 
compromise over the Galleria Shopping Center, which would be built in Aurora but close to 
the Denver city limits.  Then in 1988 Aurora and other municipalities in Adams County 
supported a ballot measure to allow Denver to annex land for the purpose of building Denver 
International Airport.  The expected economic benefits for those jurisdictions closest to the 
new airport were a powerful inducement for this nascent city-regional collaboration.   
 In the transportation planning arena, however, efforts at city-regional collaboration 
proved much more difficult. In 1987, unhappy with RTD’s lack of progress in developing a 
rapid transit system, the Colorado State Legislature authorized a private sector-led group, the 
Transit Construction Authority (TCA), to lead efforts to plan and build a light rail line in the 
southeast corridor between downtown Denver and the Denver Technological Center (a major 
employment cluster). The TCA effort collapsed in 1990 after DRCOG selected RTD’s 
southwest corridor instead of TCA’s southeast corridor as the preferred alternative to be 
submitted for federal funding consideration.  Concerns were raised about DRCOG’s ability to 
forge a regional approach to transportation and other issues.  Former Colorado Governor 
Richard Lamm said in 1989, “For all the money we’ve put into DRCOG, the returns are 
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marginal. When you try to list the dynamic things DRCOG has done, nobody can think of 
anything” (cited in O’Keefe, 1989, quoted in Leonard and Noel, 1990, p. 475).   
 Concerns such as these led Governor Roy Romer and the State Legislature in 1990 to 
create the Metropolitan Transportation Development Commission “to develop a 
comprehensive, regional solution to transportation problems plaguing the metropolitan area” 
(Metropolitan Transportation Development Commission, 1990).  The Commission produced 
a report that called for a new regional transportation plan, including both highways and rail 
transit that, according to public surveys, should be managed by a new regional authority.  No 
new authority was created, but changes in the existing transportation agencies had begun to 
occur.  In 1991, the Colorado Department of Highways (CDOH) was re-organized by the 
Legislature, and changed its name to the Colorado Department of Transportation (CDOT) to 
reflect the increasingly intermodal character of transportation planning (Goetz, 2007) and to 
align the activities of DRCOG with those of the State’s departments of transportation and 
regional transit agencies (Goetz et al., 2002).   
 Nonetheless, these hesitant moves towards city-regionalism were tinged with ongoing 
scepticism about the ability of agencies such as DRCOG and RTD to forge a regional 
consensus around planning and infrastructure.  An ongoing concern was to find ways of 
brokering territorial politics ‘from below’. In response to this issue, the Denver Chamber of 
Commerce set up the Metro Mayors Caucus (MMC) in 1993 to act as a voluntary, consensus-
based organization of 32 metropolitan area mayors. The mayors felt there was a need for a 
more collaborative regional forum to exchange ideas and viewpoints outside of the more 
confrontational public arenas.  One of our interviewees contrasted the ‘solution-based’ role of 
MMC in brokering territorial politics with the more ‘political’ approach required at the State-
level: 
…there is unanimity in the fact that we need more money to build and repair roads in Colorado. But there 
is no support in how to raise these funds. So that’s a problem. Because of the scope and the fact that we 
have the Caucus allows us to really dive in and do a lot more in-depth discussion and problem-solving. 
The Mayors Caucus is ... non-partisan...  it’s more solution oriented than political-based. When you’ve 
got the Statehouse, a lot of the issues are more politically-based. It’s a huge difference and with its own 
problems (Interview with suburban Denver mayor, March 2009). 
Along with its growing role in building regional consensus, membership of MMC has also 
grown to 39 mayors and it now holds its regular meetings at the Metro Denver Chamber of 
Commerce offices. The Caucus works closely with both DRCOG and State-level 
organisations like the Colorado Municipal League, and agreements made within the context 
of MMC have extended to these other organizations.  
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 A good example of the effectiveness of this new approach to city-regional 
collaboration is the consensus that was forged in 1997 in support of DRCOG’s Metro Vision 
2020 plan, which represented a strong statement in support of smart growth policies for the 
region.  In the 1970s, the Denver region had a notorious ‘brown-cloud’ air pollution problem 
due to increased particulates and temperature inversion smog especially during the winter 
months.  Compounding the air quality problem, traffic congestion was increasing much faster 
than population growth and there were ongoing battles over the funding and approval for 
additional suburban beltways.  Even though Governor Lamm had initially stopped the I-470 
beltway from being constructed, pieces of this outerbelt freeway eventually were built. 
DRCOG realized that a coherent vision of the region’s future was necessary and sought 
MMC as a broker of internecine conflicts. The resulting Metro Vision 2020 Plan focused on 
growth and development, the natural environment, and transportation (DRCOG, 1997).  Most 
significantly, DRCOG agreed that a regional rail transit system should be built as the 
backbone of an intermodal transportation system to help focus development in designated 
urban corridors, limit traffic congestion, and improve air quality.  
 
Regional transportation infrastructure: the FasTracks test of city-regionalism   
By the early 1990s, Denver had become an automobile-dominated city-region; one which had 
expanded its urban footprint from 105 square miles in 1950 to 459 square miles in 1990 
(Rusk, 2003).  During that same time period, population in the urbanized area increased from 
498,743 to 1,517,917, with much of the increase occurring in suburban areas.  In 1950, only 
16.6% of the urbanized population lived in suburban areas, while by 1990, nearly 70% lived 
in suburban areas.  Population density dropped from 4,741 people per square mile in 1950 to 
3,309 in 1990.  This pattern of spread-out, low-density suburban development was not at all 
well-suited for mass transit, and initial efforts to revive the old system proved unsuccessful.  
However, Denver at least had the advantage of an extensive rail right-of-way infrastructure 
already in place4. Moreover, in the MMC it also had a new political mechanism for shaping 
public and business attitudes to funding regional mass transit.  
 In 1980, the Denver RTD put together a regional transit plan that focused on building 
a light rail line in the Southeast Corridor along the line of Interstate 25 from the Denver CBD 
southwards as part of a 73-mile system.  Instead of submitting an application for federal 
funding, the RTD Board decided to place a referendum on the November 1980 ballot to 
increase the regional sales tax by 0.75% for 14 years in order to build not just the Southeast 
Corridor but also five other regional corridors.  Despite early polls that suggested the measure 
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would be approved, voters ultimately denied the referendum 54% to 46%.  At the same time, 
voters also approved an initiative that required elections for RTD board members, rather than 
board appointments by politicians (RTD, 1995). Once again voter concern over local taxes 
had driven the territorial politics of city-regionalism in Denver.  
 Despite these early setbacks, there was renewed interest in developing a regional rail 
transit system but infighting between rival agencies and authorities clouded the picture.  
Some members of the emerging regional political and business groups were sceptical of the 
ability of RTD to develop an effective regional transportation system.  Frequent concerns 
were raised about the elected board members of RTD, with claims that “RTD managed to 
attract a string of candidates known for personal problems and political gaffes,” including 
several convicted felons and outright opponents of public transit (Hodges, 1994, p.1). The 
RTD Board developed a negative reputation that cast a shadow over everything that the 
agency tried to do.  In 1990, the Colorado General Assembly promulgated Senate Bill 208 
(SB 208) which required approval by the relevant metropolitan planning organization of the 
financing and technology for all proposed fixed rail projects in Colorado (RTD, 2010).  
Traffic congestion and air quality continued to worsen, and demands for regional 
transportation solutions grew louder.  While the decision to build Denver International 
Airport was ratified in the late 1980s, some observers suggested that a regional rail transit 
system was actually a more pressing transportation need (Leonard and Noel, 1990).    
 In 1997, the RTD proposed a long-term comprehensive rapid transit plan called 
“Guide the Ride” that sought to expand rapid transit service by 100 miles using a 
combination of light rail, commuter rail, and bus/carpool lanes in the major corridors.  The 
proposed $6 billion plan would be funded by a 0.4% hike in the regional sales tax in a 
referendum that was presented to voters in November 1997, with strong backing from 
regional business and economic development organizations.   While the RTD received 
support for the Guide the Ride plan from many political and business leaders in the region, 
the RTD Board itself was sharply divided on the issue (Prendergast, 1997).  The voting 
public was once again left with the impression that the RTD Board was split and 
dysfunctional, and that RTD could not be trusted with $6 billion of public money to build a 
rapid transit system. Despite early polls showing public support, the Guide the Ride 
referendum was defeated 58% (no) to 42% (yes).       
 After the defeat of Guide the Ride in 1997, RTD continued to work on rail transit 
development in an incremental fashion.   The Southwest Corridor light rail line was 
completed in the summer of 2000, on-time and within its $177 million budget.   Projected to 
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carry 22,000 daily passengers by 2015, it had already carried 27,400 passengers daily by 
2008.  A light rail line along the Southeast Corridor was approved in 1999 as part of the 
Transportation Expansion (T-REX) highway widening project along I-25.  Upon completion 
in 2006, the $1.67 billion public-private T-REX project was 3% under budget, and was 
finished 22 months ahead of the projected completion date.   While initial passenger 
estimates called for 33,800 riders per day in 2008, actual daily ridership in 2008 was 38,500.  
Once sceptical of RTD’s ability to build and operate a rail transit system, political and 
business leaders, as well as the general public, began to believe in the viability of rail transit 
in Denver.   
 In November 2004, voters in the Denver-Aurora metropolitan area approved a 0.4% 
increase in the regional sales tax to support the FasTracks rail transit program that proposed 
to add 122 miles of light and commuter rail transit to the existing 35-mile light rail system 
(Figure 2). FasTracks would expand rail transit into six new corridors (including a line to 
Denver International Airport), extend three existing lines, build a bus rapid transit line to 
Boulder, and refurbish Denver Union Station into a multimodal transportation hub for 
intercity and regional rail and bus service (Figure 3).  At an initial cost of $4.7 billion in 2004 
(now estimated to cost $7.4 billion), the FasTracks project is one of the largest urban rail 
transit construction programs in the US.   
***Figures 2 and 3 about here*** 
 One of the major challenges faced by RTD while implementing this massive program 
was to increase the regional sales tax by 0.4%. At the very beginning, state transportation 
officials and Republican Colorado Governor Bill Owens were not in favor of this tax hike 
because of its high cost and the potential negative effects on highway funding. However, 
Owens reluctantly agreed to allow RTD to put forward the tax hike proposal on the ballot 
under the condition that FasTracks and related highway improvements along the corridors 
would be a part of the State’s comprehensive transportation plan. The Colorado Senate also 
supported RTD’s effort regarding a sales-tax hike by passing Senate Bill (SB) 167 and 
rejecting SB 1. SB 167 gave RTD the power to go to voters with a proposal of a sales-tax 
increase whenever it wanted, whereas SB 1 allowed RTD to put forward such a proposal just 
once. If RTD had wanted to propose another sales-tax hike, it would have had to seek the 
permission of the Legislature. Even though SB 167 was passed in April 2002, the referendum 
was not put on the ballot until Nov. 2004. Bill Owens did not want the RTD referendum to be 
on the ballot at the same time he was running for re-election (Leib, 2002).  
15 
 
 From the beginning RTD – with the strong support of regional business groups and 
MMC – started spending hefty sums of money to get approval from the voters. In May, the 
Metro Denver Chamber of Commerce contributed $250,000 to the pro-FasTracks campaign 
(Leib, 2004a).  A huge amount of support was also provided for the FasTracks project by 
other organizations as well as resident voters in the Denver-Aurora and Boulder metropolitan 
areas. Volunteers collected 60,000 petition signatures so that the tax-hike proposal could be 
placed on the Nov. 2004 ballot, even though only 35,000 signatures were required 
(Nicholson, 2004). The vote finally took place on Nov 2, 2004 and the tax-hike for FasTracks 
funding – Referendum 4A – was approved by 57.2% of the voters (Leib, 2004b). This was a 
tangible victory for city-regionalism in Denver. 
 However, delays in the construction of FasTracks led to an increase in the price tag of 
the project. Construction material costs rose between 2003 and 2006, much faster than RTD 
had predicted.  Furthermore, sales tax revenues were not as large as originally projected, 
especially after the national recession and global economic crisis began in the 2007-2008 
period.  By 2012, the RTD Annual Report to DRCOG on FasTracks estimated that $7.4 
billion would be required to complete the entire FasTracks project, which was $2.7 billion 
more than the initial RTD cost estimate in 2004 (RTD, 2010).  In 2006, RTD suggested that 
the best way of mitigating the problem would be by finishing construction of the lines as fast 
as possible before construction costs rose even higher.  
 But in 2008 the crisis of collective provision became so deep that RTD brought up the 
idea of shortening some of the new rail lines except the West line and Denver International 
Airport line because they were receiving $1.3 billion in Federal Transit Administration (FTA) 
funds (Leib 2008). RTD this time also tried to resolve the problem by increasing the 
construction time of some of the corridors to 2034. But the idea was vehemently opposed by 
the suburban mayors working through the MMC. The possibility of another tax-hike was also 
proposed. Even though it was initially supported by the mayors, the RTD Board rejected 
placing another sales tax increase measure on the November 2010, 2011, or 2012 ballots, 
because of continuing concerns about the economic and political climate.  
 With FasTracks facing a significant funding shortfall, in May of 2011 the FTA 
awarded $1 billion to the RTD for the completion of the so-called Eagle P-3 (public-private 
partnership) project, which includes the East Corridor to Denver International Airport, the 
Gold Line commuter train to Arvada/Wheat Ridge and a segment of the Northwest train line 
to south Westminster. In awarding the money to Denver, the head of the FTA, Peter Rogoff, 
commented that “When it comes to private-sector involvement in transportation, Denver is 
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the model” (cited in Lieb, 2011). Nonetheless, the FasTracks program has proven to be a 
stern test of that model and, in particular, the level of city-regional collaboration achieved to 
implement it in the first place. In this case, the US federal state has eventually had to play a 
significant role in mediating city-regionalism ‘from above’.  
 
Some wider theoretical reflections  
The case study allows us to reflect upon certain aspects of how city-regionalism in Denver 
has evolved in response to territorial politics inside the US state. Metropolitan political 
fragmentation has often been seen as a challenge to collective action around the provision of 
urban infrastructure and services (Ostrom et al., 1961). The specific challenge most often 
highlighted is one of local fiscal capacity, although views differ on how to address this in 
terms of reorganizing the territorial structure of the state in metropolitan areas (Cox and 
Jonas, 1993). One possibility is the sharing and externalization of costs through regionalized 
fiscal collaborative arrangements. But often this involves drawing in local and higher levels 
of local government – counties and states – into new territorial structures (Miller, 1981). Thus 
regionalization is not neutral with respect to wider interests, structures and processes 
operating inside the competition state. The question, then, is whether this process is driven 
‘from below’ or happens in response to pressures ‘from above’; therefore the form of 
territorial politics does matter.   
 In the Denver case, an important factor has been changing public attitudes to mass 
transit as reflected in the US federal state’s willingness to support regional provision, albeit 
this has clearly been nurtured by powerful economic and political interests ‘from below’. 
Indeed, the political constituency for regionalism and mass transit in Denver is arguably far 
stronger today than it has been at any other point in the city-region’s history, a fact confirmed 
by several of our interviewees: 
Interviewer: Looking back at the history of this metro area there seems to have been quite a lot of 
antagonism historically between the suburbs [and the city], I don’t know if [suburb X] is in that category 
or not ... But now you seem to have a climate of cooperation. 
Interviewee: We do. 
Interviewer: Is that a fair characterization? Was FasTracks one of the major foci for that? 
Interviewee: I think there has always been the DRCOG, the Denver Regional Council of Governments, 
[and] there was a little bit of a culture of regional cooperation. I think the Metro Mayors’ Caucus again 
helped to crystallise that a little bit and again the way the Caucus is structured is very important. There 
has to be a consensus and everyone has one vote. You can be [the Mayor of Denver] from the largest city 
or the Mayor of [small suburb Y]. You are still in the same boat and it really creates the sense of 
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regionalism in that I think it is fairly uncommon around the country. I think that the FasTracks effort in 
2004 probably solidified that sense of [regionalism]. (Interview with suburban Denver elected official, 
March 2009). 
 Other contingencies help to explain the evolving geopolitical landscape  of city-
regional collaboration in Denver. Firstly, practitioners in Denver have not been indifferent to 
the wider urban policy landscape, which has made it possible to embed New Regionalist 
structures locally. Of these structures, perhaps the key institutional mechanism in Denver has 
been MMC. Several of our respondents singled out the role of MMC in joining together the 
component territorial parts of city-regionalism: 
The Metro Mayors’ Caucus was created to do things politically that city councils would be divided on 
individually or if DRCOG didn’t want the controversy associated with them. And it’s consensus based. 
If there’s not 100% vote then they don’t do it. I mean little Foxfield -- a [jurisdiction with a] couple of 
horse properties and strips of asphalt -- has [in effect] the same votes as John Edgar Hoover [former 
FBI Director] has, and DRCOG is weighted disproportionately you know; the City of Denver has a 
disproportionate vote. So everything has to be done by consensus (Interview with Denver Regional 
Economic Development Organization, April, 2009). 
It is important to note that organizations such as MMC do not replace existing state territorial 
structures but instead operate alongside them: 
... [I]f you think about the Regional Council of Governments, it’s a formal regional institution, but it 
played a role, a lesser role than that of the Metro Mayors [Caucus], which was really an ad hoc place 
that sort of again, jumped outside of the regional structure, because the regional structure wasn’t 
[working]. The way that the COG is set up it is kind of a creature of the Federal government’s 
requirements that certain monies flow through a regional body (Interview with Denver Community 
Developer, March 2009). 
 A second contingent factor driving city-regionalism in Denver is the use of new 
regional territorial structures to leverage taxes for major infrastructural projects such as 
FasTracks. This has meant, in effect, stretching the territorial limits of the city so as to 
embrace wider-scale constituencies and processes:  
Usually people have ended up at the regional level by necessity, either as a practical reality of 29 waste 
water treatment plants or one or two centralized ones, that kind of drives you in a direction, and there’s 
a practical reality of some of those other things. But by and large, it’s still a sort of fragmented world, 
which is why the alliance of the business community and Metro Mayors’. Those people are deciding 
that they are going to make the region effective despite the way the boundaries are drawn. (Interview 
with Denver Community Developer, March 2009). 
Along with this, thirdly, there is a recognition that the regional political culture of Denver 
itself has changed as voters, otherwise hostile to new local taxes, have been taught to see the 
value of publicly-funded regional mass transportation: 
18 
 
We in the west [i.e. western United States], in particular, believe in direct democracy not representative 
democracy, which means that more and more decisions are going directly to the voters than being dealt 
with by legislative bodies, for example, the legislature or the city council. So again it takes sort of a 
different mindset if you will, of getting people, transportation planners to think about, you know, “how 
do you package this [for the voters]?” (Interview with Regional Civic Organization, September, 2007). 
The present Governor of Colorado, John Hickenlooper, who was Mayor of Denver at the time 
of the FasTracks sales-tax vote, claimed that a crucial factor was the decision to give the 
suburban mayors most of the credit for the success of the FasTracks initiative even though in 
many other cases they had been bitterly opposed to regional initiatives led by Denver.5   
 A final variable in the evolving landscape of city-regionalism in Denver is the 
importance attributed to overcoming potential suburban opposition. What has been a 
particular concern is managing local interests in the collective provision of services and 
environmental amenities. This has meant in this case the business-led ‘growth coalition’ 
building functional ‘bottom up’ alliances with environmental groups, local governments, and 
various civic organizations on common regional issues: 
This all makes sense from business standpoint, and you have to go around looking for allies and all of a 
sudden you find, “gees, the environmental guys, they have got a lot of people who can walk every 
precinct for you” and they have got an environmental agenda which is kind of your agenda because if 
you are too polluted, companies don’t move here. Certain types of companies can’t move here because 
of the air quality. So it just all kind of fell into place and again, we have gone through a metamorphosis 
as an organization realising that you take your partners where you can find them and you don’t 
necessarily draw on those on ideological or other places where you have fought (Interview with Denver 
Regional Economic Development Organization, April, 2009). 
How long these new city-regionalist structures can be sustained is hard to say but it does 
depend on the governance of territorial politics. 
 
Conclusions 
 In this paper, we have chosen to examine city-regionalism as an example of territorial 
politics around the collective provision of transportation infrastructure. Our empirical focus 
has been the FasTracks light and commuter rail project in Denver and the emergence of a 
powerful city-regional coalition involved in driving this program forward. The case study 
encourages us to reflect on some recent developments in the literature on the rise of city-
regionalism in the geopolitical landscape of capitalist development. It confirms the 
constitutive role of territorial politics in shaping how city-regionalism in the US is assembled 
in particular circumstances. As such, the study offers a counterfoil to relational thinking on 
these issues. 
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 With respect to ‘top down’ territorial politics inside the US, we have drawn attention 
to the role of the federal state in shaping the landscape of city-regionalism through various 
fiscal incentives for regional planning and transportation infrastructure. In the Denver case, it 
would be difficult to argue that the US state has played a strong unilateral hand in shaping 
city-regional governance ‘from above’. However, the US state and its territorial structure 
have provided the enabling fiscal and administrative conditions for the evolving landscape of 
city-regionalism. Regional transportation and planning agencies set up in Denver under 
federal jurisdiction in the 1950s and 1960s eventually proved weak and lacking in the fiscal 
capacities to address severe shortfalls in the collective provision of mass transportation 
infrastructure. Yet the federal state has of late chosen to support the FasTracks program 
financially, citing regional collaboration as an important condition for its intervention. In the 
Denver case, then, the dominant direction in organizing city-regionalism has been – and 
continues to be – ‘from below’, albeit always mediated by wider state territorial structures 
and funding regimes.  
 The case study also supports the argument that local territorial contingencies are 
important in shaping the ‘bottom up’ form of city-regionalism inside the US state (Jonas, 
2013). The reason most often cited for the lack of metropolitan provision is the chronic 
dependence on local sources of revenue amid dwindling levels of federal funding. The 
recourse to alternative regionalized structures of funding (in this case, the regional sales tax) 
helps to leverage economies of scale and spread the tax burden across a wider electorate. In 
Denver, however, this has necessitated ways of drawing in business, local governments and 
the electorate into new city-regional collaborations. In this context, the Metro Mayors Caucus 
has enabled territorial politics to be brokered prior to putting forward regional transit 
initiatives to a public vote. The political culture of regionalism and a growing consensus 
around a smart growth agenda is more developed in this respect in Denver than in those 
metropolitan areas where racial tensions, class divisions, and sprawling development 
continue to frustrate regional transit provision (Goetz, 2013; Rusk, 2003).  
 Our study raises questions about the drift away from incorporating knowledge of 
territorial politics in explaining how city-regionalism arises. What matters here is not just 
what goes on inside city-regions: for example, how governance is assembled in order to 
overcome the internal territorial politics of city regions (e.g. the politics of cities versus 
suburbs). It is also about how city-regionalist processes interface with wider struggles around 
territorial structures of the competition state: struggles, for example, to draw down 
infrastructural funding to fast growing city-regions; the allocation of fiscal and administrative 
20 
 
capacities across different territorial structures of the state; the competition between city-
regions to attract inward investment; and suchlike. All of this in turn suggests that the 
competition state itself has an internal territorial politics of distribution and that city-regions 
are positioned differently in relation to this. Therefore we see intellectual value in 
investigating city-regionalism as a contingent territorial politics, the outcome of which is 
socially determined not least by the state working, as it were, both ‘from above’ and ‘from 
below’ in order to organize, for example, a regionalized space of collective provision 
functional for urban economic development. 
  
Notes 
1 Light-based regional product is an estimate of regional economic activity based on night-
time light intensity derived from satellite imagery. 
2 The dearth of federal funding today can be contrasted with the robust levels of federal 
transportation funding during the 1950s/60s Keynesian era in which a 90% federal/10% state 
and local match funded the construction of the Interstate Highway System.   
3Today RTD is governed by a 15-member Board of Directors whose members are elected in 
geographic districts throughout an 8-county region, including all of Boulder, Broomfield, 
Denver, and Jefferson counties, as well as parts of Adams, Arapahoe, Douglas, and Weld 
counties.  The Board is responsible for “setting District policy, adopting the agency’s annual 
budget, and establishing short and long-range transit goals and plans in concert with local, 
state, and federal agencies” (RTD, 2009, p.12).  
4 Denver’s rail right-of-way infrastructure is owned by the Burlington Northern-Santa Fe 
Railroad and the Union Pacific Railroad.  So while some of the existing rail rights-of-way 
have been utilized to build or plan new rail transit lines, the use of the rights-of-way are 
subject to financial negotiation with the freight rail corporations.  One of the reasons for the 
cost increases of the FasTracks program has been sharply increased costs of acquiring access 
to these rights-of-way from the freight railroads.  
5 The California planner, Bill Fulton, has dubbed Hickenlooper’s leadership style as 
“brewpub regionalism” (Hickenlooper opened a brewpub in Denver’s lower downtown 
district before eventually running for Mayor) (see http://www.cp-dr.com/node/1702, accessed 
August 1, 2011). Now a regular invited speaker on the national conference circuit of urban 
professionals, Hickenlooper himself has described the Denver approach to city-regionalism 
and regional transportation provision as “collaboration for competition” (see: 
http://urbanomnibus.net/2011/07/ford-foundation-the-just-city/, accessed March 20, 2012).   
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